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Conclusion 
Democratizing Poverty 
Frank Munger 
By now, studies of poverty policy have examined in detail the incidence, causes, and consequences of the behaviors that, according to underclass and culture-of-poverty theories, keep people poor. Mainstream research, 
however, doesn't try to evaluate the identities attached to poor persons by such 
theories, nor does it question the assumptions that individualize responsibility 
for poverty.1 Ethnographers set out to counter the norms of such policy research 
and redeem the poor by uncovering complex interactions between individuals 
and institutions that illuminate their motivations and their instrumental deci-
sion making. Interpretive studies show that poor persons make appropriate use 
of cultural and material resources to survive and get ahead. These survival 
strategies often are extraordinarily creative, but they are no less dependent on 
human and social capital-knowledge, "soft skills," and networks of sup-
porting relationships-than those of people who live in greater affluence. 
By broadening our understanding of the needs of the poor and the limita-
tions of the environments in which they live, ethnographies overturn the notion 
that poverty is monolithic and highlight the many different settings in which 
the working poor struggle to make lives that fit their unique circumstances. 
Moreover, as Sanders Korenman (see chapter 5 commentary, this volume), a 
former member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, confirms, 
qualitative research has an important role to play in the development of more 
effective poverty policies. 
The contributors to this volume address the causes of poverty by exploring 
the influence of social and institutional continuities on individual perceptions 
and choices that cut across traditional policy variables and subject domains, and 
in so doing, they examine life experiences with a wide-angle lens. Indeed, their 
studies make it difficult or even impossible to factor poverty into distinct vari-
ables.2 In these ethnographies, work, family formation, street life, and interac-
tions with public agencies-life elements that look like starting points in 
traditional poverty research-appear as outcomes: arcs that begin with the 
development of perceptions, values, and expectations, and end in action. Social 
structure occupies an important place in these accounts of consciousness and 
action, as the per~eptions of poor persons are shaped through encounters over 
290 / 
DEMOCRATIZING POVERTY 
their lifetimes with public institutions, family relationships and networks of 
friends, the physical layout of cities and neighborhoods, police beats and 
bureaucracies, neighborhood commerce, the location of jobs, and the organiza-
tion of employment. As we focus on how perceptions develop, we tum away 
from narrow measurements of the effectiveness of welfare programs to exam-
ine the social and institutional structures and resources that influence the capac-
ities of individuals and groups to survive and change. 
Discussions of how individuals are constituted as social actors by these fun-
damental structural relations lead to the question of how research might help 
persons and groups become active agents of further change. Michael Frisch 
(chapter 7 commentary, this volume) describes interpretive research as a "dia-
logue of possibility" in which subjects are themselves creative actors who 
understand what it means to live within the unfavorable conditions scholars set 
out to study. Since they share the experiences of other poor persons, they often 
achieve a "multivalent" vision (to borrow again from Frisch) of their circum-
stances, a vision that incorporates the possibility of different life trajectories and 
resists the categorical interpretations of those whose experiences of poverty, 
class, and gender are different. Frisch suggests that this multivalent vision might 
write a new vocabulary of connection and collective action for poor persons 
who share the experience of marginalization and who have been excluded from 
the theater of ordinary politics. Thus the role of scholars in generating narra-
tives may be catalytic rather than interpretive. 
Identity is also crucial to the symbolic politics of poverty, and if we are to 
overcome public resistance to more generous social supports for the poor, we 
must decipher how identity issues are used to gauge moral deservingness in the 
first place. The contributors herein address this important issue-Rainwater 
(1970) left it unresolved-only indirectly. How will ambiguities that arise from 
ethnography's more complex descriptions of the identities and the lives of the 
poor affect the symbolic politics of poverty? Ethnographers themselves often 
are divided about interpretations of causation, autonomy, and the sources of 
individual agency-questions central to the moral politics of poverty and 
policy making. 
This last chapter will look at the expanded mission for ethnography that 
emerges from the other essays in the volume. First, I will examine the persis-
tence of stereotypes of the poor and explore how such stereotypes contribute to 
govemmentality, the ideological structure that underlies public control of social 
life. Stereotypes of the poor prove their value to our national discourse by legit-
imating particular forms of public dominion and control. They justify the phe-
nomenon of durable inequality, which scholars and members of the public alike 
often attribute to differences in individual character or accidents of birth. Fur-
ther, such stereotypes reinforce exploitation of those disadvantaged through 
the familiar social divisions of race, gender, class, and citizenship. The following 
section then looks at the evidence for public beliefs that underlie the symbolic 
politics of poverty and find ambivalence there. The final sections of the chapter 
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describe the resources the identity project must draw on to transform our dis-
cussion of the lives of the poor and move toward the broader goal: democra-
tizing poverty. 
POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IDENTITY OF THE POOR 
Although he calls for valid phenomenological analysis of the lives of the poor, 
Rainwater (1970, 12) predicts that our stereotypes will be resistant to change 
because they have deep psychological roots in the guilt we feel, knowing that 
we derive "various kinds of gains and gratifications from the existence of the 
disinherited." Fear of poverty, as well as fear of the poor, offers an explanation 
for the persistence of stereotypes about those who live at the margins of the 
American economy. We may retreat to hackneyed images of the poor so that 
we won't have to admit how similar we are. None of us is immune to feelings 
of marginality or worries about stable employment or concern for the safety of 
our children; and it is impossible not to recognize the moral complexity of our 
own lives in the dilemmas that confront the poor. So our need to distance our-
selves from them is an expression of our deep aversion to the stigmatization 
they suffer; and the more insecure we feel, the more we seem to cling to our con-
viction that the poor have failed to work hard enough and that we can avoid 
their fate by industriousness and good citizenship. 
Poverty and Governmentality 
Rainwater's theory grounds our stereotypes of the poor in the basic psychol-
ogy of perception rather than in politics. If he is right-if our views of the poor 
are rooted in our own psychological needs, if cognitive dissonance alone 
determines both our perception of poverty and the policies based on that 
perception-then to change the nature of welfare programs indeed would be 
difficult.3 Yet the public seems to feel ambivalent about the identity and 
deservingness of the poor, and widespread stereotyping in public discourse 
and public policy may depend less on psychological need than on the fact that 
stereotyping serves the self-interest of more privileged groups. Gans (1995) 
describes the advantages we, the nonpoor, derive from such stereotypes: they 
reinforce the identity of the non poor by justifying avoidance of the "dangers" 
posed by the poor, by making the nonpoor feel superior as possessors of traits 
distinct from the traits of the poor, and by contributing to spatial stigmatiza-
tion that justifies patterns of exclusion and social control. Each of these bene-
fits is realized through concrete practices by nonpoor individuals and 
institutions-through standards for public behavior and policing, regulation 
of land use, and decisions about the placement of transportation routes as 
well as other public interests and needs-that might be hard to justify with-
out our stereotypes of the poor.4 
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Most important, these stereotypes isolate the poor from the mainstream 
labor force, confining them to the margins of the labor market, where they serve 
useful roles as a reserve army of occasional workers who supplement the needs 
of the legitimate economy by cycling in and out of work ( off the books) and who 
cost their employers nothing more than an hourly wage. If immigrants, mem-
bers of certain ethnic groups, African Americans, and residents of the decaying 
urban cores experience greatly reduced quality of life as a result of their exclu-
sion from well-compensated work, then that is a cost they pay to protect the 
privileges of others. If their exclusion prompts them to become providers of ille-
gal goods (drugs, for instance) desired by many who are not poor, then their 
response to the absence of work only proves to these others that they don't 
deserve honest employment. 
Gans's description of the functions of poverty shows how deeply implicated 
it is ingovernmentality, the replication of power in the everyday ordering of our 
lives (Foucault 1977; Hunt 1994). Since its benefits promote the interests of 
politicians, welfare administrators, and the public at large, stereotyping of the 
poor serves as one of the organizing principles of govemmentality.5 Suburban 
residents, for example, manipulate the concept of blight and the stereotypical 
identities of those who cause it in the symbolic politics of neighborhood build-
ing and preservation. Inner-city schools, too, because of the poor children who 
attend them, represent the unspoken Other that proves the superiority of sub-
urban schools and justifies their elitism. Thus poverty, like crime, is exploited 
as a means of govemance.6 The identity of the poor becomes a key to the manip-
ulation of economic policies. Stereotypes of welfare recipients are used to re-
inforce an image of an Other whose morally undeserving behavior explains and 
motivates policies of redistribution and regulation.7 Economic dependency, 
like crime, is perceived as a pervasive threat, and in order to serve as a symbol 
of dependency, welfare recipients must be constructed as nonworkers who 
refuse to accept the discipline and risk of the labor market in exchange for its 
rewards.8 Similarly, policies that "responsibilize" employment for the regu-
larly employed-by cutting wages and benefit levels on the grounds that they 
represent excess "fat" in the operating budgets of the corporations that drive 
the mainstream economy-are justified to prevent the transfer of burdens 
borne by workers to the larger economic community (Rose 1999).9 
Poverty, Identity, and Durable Inequality 
The poor set a baseline for categorical distinctions between those who receive 
the full benefits and protections of the welfare state and those who must be 
required to take up more of its burdens. What makes them useful, of course, is 
the subtle, unspoken link between poverty and durable inequality (Tilly 1998).10 
The poor have a gender, a race, often an immigrant status, and a class identity-
the emphasis depending on context.11 Welfare to work plays well as a recom-
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mendation for teenage, single-parent African American women, although this 
group is in truth a small minority of actual welfare recipients (Handler and 
Hasenfeld 1997). Displeasure with illegal immigrants has been redirected to 
support denial of benefits to all immigrants, both legal and illegal. Images of 
undisciplined blue-collar employees as a class that exploits unearned union 
benefits, workers' compensation, or health care coverage are deployed to jus-
tify cutting back on labor protections and insurance, even as we praise the indi-
vidual worker and raise the Earned Income Tax Credit or minimum wage. All 
of these identities reinforce the notion that employment protections pose moral 
hazards for poor or unemployed workers, who may need the harsh discipline 
of the unregulated labor market to keep them honest and industrious.12 Under 
pressure to informalize work, increase the scope of contingent labor, and under-
mine the social contract with labor that has prevailed since World War II, these 
identities of poor and dependent persons become powerful political tools. 
Low-wage workers are victims of such deregulation and reform, as Saskia 
Sassen (chapter 2 commentary, this volume) demonstrates in her discussion of 
the effects of the global transformation of work on the lives of low-wage labor-
ers. Trends in globalization have contributed to the informalization of work. 
Expansion and consolidation of producer services, such as financial and infor-
mation technology, along with concentration of corporate headquarters in the 
economic cores of major cities, has established" a new regime of economic activ-
ity" that depends not only on a highly skilled cadre of workers, but also on low-
skilled workers who maintain, build, clean, deliver, copy, word process, answer 
phones, and especially, meet the rapidly rising demands for personal services 
for the wealthy. In addition, the postindustrial economy has "downgrad[ed] a 
broad range of manufacturing sectors." Sweatshops and home work have pro-
liferated as the American firm has reorganized the lower-level workforce, all 
but eliminating union-negotiated protections and benefits in the private sector 
and significantly lowering the expectations of employees, while at the same 
time maintaining sufficient managerial capacity to enforce the discipline that 
the new regime requires (Gordon 1996). Finally, informalization extends beyond 
the manufacturing sector to distribution of goods and services that cannot com-
pete with "cheap imports or for space and other business needs with the new 
high-profit firms engendered by the advanced corporate service economy" 
(Sassen this volume, 75). 
The creation of low-wage informal work has played an essential part in the 
economic boom that signals America's role as leader of globalization, and in 
large cities, low-wage workers represent the engine on which the new global-
ized economy depends. The theory of comparative advantage in the global 
economy predicts that the number of jobs in sectors in which the United States 
is dominant (primarily highly skilled jobs in technology and professional ser-
vices) should grow, while the low-wage job market should decline as manu-
facturing industries move to Third World societies where low-wage labor is 
plentiful and cheap. Sassen's research demonstrates, however, how crucially 
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low-wage workers function in advanced technological societies to sustain tech-
nological and financial industries, specialized manufacturing, and a broad 
range of service industries. 
The growing importance of low-wage work in the global informal economy 
would lead us to expect that employers would support reproduction of the pool 
of low-wage workers in order to keep wages low and keep groups that supply 
such workers insecure and competing with each other. Indeed, poor minorities, 
women, and some workers from the formerly unionized industrial workforce 
do constitute a large pool of low-wage laborers; but American businesses want 
more. They welcome illegal immigrants, support welfare-to-work reforms, and 
continue to undermine benefits, wage increases, and job security. These prac-
tices have their most oppressive effects on workers with the least bargaining 
power, whom durable inequality has kept isolated, segregated, or stigmatized 
as a social group. Thus even in a time of full employment, low-wage workers, 
especially those in categories defined by durable inequality, experience great 
insecurity, and many do not find jobs at all (Freeman 1994). 
Identity legitimates the uneven effects of informalization on particular 
social groups. As long as workers in the low-wage labor pool are seen as inex-
perienced, undisciplined, unsocialized, and undereducated, few will question 
the effects of informalization. Gender has done this identity work before: his-
torically, women's identity-both their emotional-intellectual identity and as 
men's dependents-suited them for low-skill, low-pay, low-benefit work. In 
such terms, the entire low-wage workforce has been feminized by the notion 
that informal and low-wage jobs are "starters," valuable because they teach the 
soft skills and motivation workers need to move up the employment ladder. 
For those who don't share it, this identity successfully masks the problem 
of aggregate shortages of jobs that offer sustainable employment for low-wage 
workers. Other structural features of the low-wage job market explain why 
even those who do not find low-wage jobs accept the mainstream interpreta-
tion that failure to do so is their fault. Harvey ( chapter 2 commentary, this vol-
ume) argues that most workers, including low-wage workers, have some 
experience of the success of individual job searches, but little understanding 
of the aggregate job shortages that confront them. His analysis of the economic 
implications of job queues and the interaction of queues and shortages demon-
strates that the problem of poverty related to low-wage work and unemploy-
ment can only be solved by increasing the number of jobs for low-wage workers. 
Efforts to improve job readiness and job search strategies won't help much. As 
long as the discussion of low-wage jobs continues to focus on the motives and 
character of the unemployed, policies that shift the risks of unemployment to 
the poor will prevail. 
The rollback of employee benefits, increasing job insecurity, and welfare 
reform, like the new politics of crime control, proceed from entrenched assump-
tions about the behavior of employees, the poor, and welfare recipients. These 
related changes in governance are supported by stereotypes of dependent and 
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outsider groups. Gans does not underestimate the difficulty of changing our 
approaches to poverty and, more generally, our approaches to economic and 
social inclusion of the poor. Gans addresses this problem, in part, by urging a 
campaign to "debunk" stereotypes. Yet his own description of the entrench-
ment of stereotypes makes it clear that unless this effort is targeted to the spe-
cific constituencies that benefit from stereotypes and to their motives for 
maintaining them, efforts to bring about change may fail. 
HOW THE PUBLIC PERCEIVES THE MORAL IDENTITY OF THE POOR 
We have considered how the identity of the poor has been exploited to serve 
the interests of privileged groups, and how it continues to reinforce enduring 
inequality. Yet how does the public identify characteristics of the poor and 
translate them into moral judgments? Gans suggests that the aspirations of poor 
persons and their capacity to change are critical to our judgments of their 
deservingness; but aspirations are not observable. They function out of sight, 
on the borderland of identity, where poverty, welfare, and the meaning of com-
munity are negotiated. 
We get a rough picture of the public's view of the poor from polling data. 
Shortly after the victory by the political right in the off-year congressional elec-
tions of 1994, a New York Times/ CBS poll confirmed that the public subscribed 
to negative stereotypes of persons who received welfare assistance, and en-
dorsed reductions in benefits as well as imposition of work requirements. In the 
same poll, at the height of the conservatives' power and just as the United States 
was beginning to emerge from a severe recession, the public also expressed its 
willingness to pay for job training, child care, and other benefits for needy par-
ents, even if those expenditures triggered tax increases (Dowd 1994). Such 
apparently contradictory modes of understanding public provision for the poor 
are long-standing. In recent surveys, more than 85 percent of all adults en-
dorsed the idea that recipients should be required to work for their welfare 
benefits. Among liberals and conservatives, blacks and whites, women and 
men, the statistics told the same story. A large majority of respondents also 
endorsed relatively generous benefits for those who are trying to comply with 
work requirements but who need education or services to do so. Moreover, a 
majority agreed that such benefits should be extended beyond standard time 
limits if necessary, even at increased cost to the public.13 
In the contemporary politics of welfare reform (and the context of increas-
ing insecurity in the workplace, even for many who once enjoyed job security), 
the requirement to work has acquired overwhelming importance. The idea 
that welfare recipients should work has simmered since the 1960s, when the 
AFDC program began to be viewed as a semipermanent subsidy game for 
inner-city, never married African American mothers. In the deracinated poli-
tics of the 1990s, the turn to policies that discipline the poor along with other 
296 / 
DEMOCRATIZING POVERTY 
workers has replaced more overtly racist politics spurred by the white back-
lash of the 1980s (see Simon 1997). The outcry against affirmative action, school 
desegregation orders, bilingualism, and immigration has been subsumed into 
a politics of citizenship that ignores differences in needs and values and 
homogenizes regulation of welfare state benefits on the basis of a single 
principle: that the deserving person-the person who works-will be 
rewarded. In this environment, the disciplinary component of poverty policies 
is reserved for those who share the stereotypical identity "nonworking" and 
who fall into one or more other familiar categories-ethnic, female, immigrant, 
or inner-city resident. 
Members of the public draw sharp distinctions between themselves and 
welfare recipients. A recent poll conducted by the Washington Post-Kaiser 
Family Foundation (1998), revealed that only about 7 percent of respondents 
said they believe persons on welfare have values very like their own.14 Fur-
ther, only 6 percent of Americans identify themselves as poor.15 This low rate 
of self-identification is striking in a nation with an official poverty rate of 
about 13 percent, and where at least twice as many of us are functionally poor 
by many scholars' estimates.16 Nearly one third of all American adults iden-
tify themselves as working class-and this includes a majority of those whose 
incomes fall well below the poverty line. Rainwater's (1970) cognitive disso-
nance theory explains why most people, including those who are objectively 
poor, believe that poverty is a status that places individuals outside the realm 
of ordinary experience and isolates them from the larger community. Most of 
the poor deny that identity in their own self-perceptions, and with good rea-
son: the poor are stigmatized, and not the least factor, the stigma is racial (see 
Gillens 1999). For whites, the poor are black. For persons of color, the poor are 
lazy, self-destructive, and above all, not like us. 
In fact, although the differences between wealth and poverty may be rela-
tively clear at the extremes, the differences between poor and nonpoor persons 
is largely artificial. In objective terms, individuals' incomes fluctuate over their 
lifetimes. Huge numbers of people move into and out of employment, and 
whether they are classified as poor or nonpoor, they share a range of common 
experiences. Their similarities blur the distinctions between successful and 
unsuccessful, deserving and undeserving. This is why, paradoxically, they are 
reluctant to acknowledge either their own experiences of economic insecurity 
or the citizenship of the nonworking poor. Many Americans are threatened by 
unemployment and involuntary underproductivity.17 Many, especially women, 
are compelled to work in roles that are not typically defined as productive. In 
practice, these niches of dependency exist in tension with the dominant norms 
of citizenship, and whether they want to admit it or not, persons who occupy 
them must continually negotiate their status. The prevalence of niche identities 
is growing in the postmodern economy, and our rising consciousness of such 
identities may set the stage for transformations of our collective understanding 
of the meaning of poverty and low-wage work.18 
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Notwithstanding the patriarchal values, racist presumptions, and insensi-
tivities to individual differences that seem to inform our welfare policies, the 
public-or at least large segments of it-may take complex and more benign 
views of poverty. We may hope that negative perceptions of poverty in some 
survey data do not reflect the fundamental values of those who have shared 
job insecurity. We may hope that resistance to adequate provision for the poor 
is a product of misperceptions about responsibility, fears about the future, and 
complex responses to racial politics. We may hope that a spirit of fairness will 
succeed in the end, and that arguments based on race, gender, or lifestyle only 
mask our deep and insistent suspicion that the poor really are like us. We may 
hope that appeals to ascriptive differences may be weakened by evidence that 
individuals are meeting their obligations as citizens, whether or not work in 
the conventional labor market results from their efforts. 
THE IDENTITY PROJECT 
What can interpretive research do to address the persistence of political, social, 
and psychological strategies that secure the interests-and assuage the fears-
of some groups in society at the expense of others? First and foremost, such 
research can particularize identity, show that it is not merely a cluster of cliches 
slapped on the poor by power holders who need justification for the policies 
they make. Ethnography can demonstrate that identity is a real, personal pos-
session, owned privately by each of us, poor and nonpoor alike; that it organizes 
our sense of self, unlocks (or locks) our agency, our capacity to act and react, to 
make the most or least of opportunities and obstacles. By unraveling their indi-
vidual identities, by showing how those identities develop under conditions 
that are hidden from politicians and the public, and by celebrating their embrace 
of familiar values and goals, ethnography can redeem the poor. 
Yet as Rainwater predicted, and as we have seen, complex and ambiguous 
stories about people in poverty sometimes are difficult to comprehend. One 
ethnographic strategy tries to validate the decisions (and thus the lives) of the 
poor by showing that they are rational, that they enact mainstream values 
despite severe constraints. This approach calls for selective investigation of 
the circumstances and decisions through which the poor succeed in acting 
autonomously and strategically as they seek to resist or escape poverty. A sec-
ond strategy constructs stories that show how the poor-even those who have 
the will to change-are captured by their poverty, trapped by the social ties 
that at once enable survival and smother autonomy. The behavior of poor per-
sons who suffer extreme oppression sometimes must be understood as a 
product of that oppression, and not as an expression of resistance, subversion, 
or double consciousness. Handler suggests in his commentary (this volume) 
that prescriptions for change are greatly complicated by the fact that poverty 
has an effect on capacity for self-help as well as on opportunities for self-help. 
Only after personal and institutional transformations empower the poor to 
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shape new identities for themselves, he argues, will they be able to make their 
own way through the world. 
If the dialogue among these different approaches to ethnography only com-
plicates our picture of the character of the poor, then ethnography has failed. 
Qualitative researchers go further, however, and transform the questions we 
ask about poverty. They foreground the agency of individuals as they examine 
the resources available for the development of personal character and the situ-
ations and interactions in which these resources can be deployed. Increasingly, 
qualitative researchers focus on the role of institutional environments in the 
lives of the poor as encounters with those environments guide individual 
agency and feed or thwart the capacity for change. Conceptually, ethnogra-
phers explore sophisticated frameworks for understanding the experiences of 
the poor and the effects of poverty on behavior. Empirically, they track changes 
in the low-wage job market, the increasing privatization of dependency and risk 
on which that market is founded, and the creation of durable inequalities that 
restrict and allocate opportunities by race, immigrant status, class, and gender. 
Carol Stack (chapter 1, this volume) introduces us to the world of low-wage 
work through the eyes of teenagers who begin their interactions with that 
world in fast-food restaurants in Oakland and Harlem. They may be at the bot-
tom of the employment ladder now, but they are also at the peak of hopeful- . 
ness about moving up. Stack enters their lives to find out what means most to 
them, how they expend their not-quite-unlimited energy. Work turns out to be 
central to these young people. Many of us who have jobs in the mainstream 
learned about work by being connected to the world of our parents, and 
through them, to the landscape of adult life. Oakland teens often get less effec-
tive parenting than we did, but they commit themselves to work because they 
too understand it as a pathway to adulthood. For all the energy and promise of 
the young woman Stack follows through the critical passages of maturation, 
fast-food work is likely to lead nowhere. Although the young workers learn 
many unnamed skills, there is no next level of related employment; there is no 
up from this job. Unless the worker can draw on other forms of capital-edu-
cation, financially capable parents, or a relative in business-her work experi-
ence may not carry her anywhere but to another low-wage service job. The 
teenager has played by the power holders' rules and overturned the negative 
stereotypes through which they see and judge the poor. So what is her reward? 
What happens to her expectations? 
The answer may strike us as painful, but it is inescapable: the careers of low-
wage workers, like Stack's teens, are circumscribed by the durable inequality 
that defines their life worlds and by important differences in social and human 
capital that affect the significance of low-wage job opportunities. In chapter 2, 
Ruth Buchanan's detailed examination of the experience of finding and hold-
ing a low-wage job in the telemarketing industry in Canada illuminates a 
related effect of globalization, namely, the exploitation of individuals in niche 
labor markets. Employment in telemarketing is an important paradigm because 
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there is no apparent shortage of potential employees for work that is often 
demanding and stressful. 
Buchanan's study points to an important transformation in the low-wage 
nonindustrial workforce, once overwhelmingly female, but now drawing both 
men and women. Telework has many of the qualities that jobs in the historically 
segmented gendered labor market had: it is low-waged and contingent, with 
little recognition of the skills it requires. The image of low-wage workers-
including workers in the new informalized manufacturing sector-indeed has 
become feminized in the sense that they are represented as lacking experi-
ence, discipline, and commitment to full-time work. The actual composition 
of low-wage workforces (women with family responsibilities, immigrant 
women, men with limited education) often confirms this stereotype, but as 
Buchanan shows, people accept low-wage jobs because of limitations on their 
human and social capital, not because they are poorly motivated or uncom-
mitted to full-time employment. 
For women, the decision to enter the low-wage job market is complicated 
by family responsibilities and by the structural dependency that these respon-
sibilities (they amount to unpaid labor in the home) create. In the case of female 
single parents, the stereotypical image of the low-wage or contingent worker 
is particularly ironic. Female single parents are poor because of widespread 
expectations for women's care work and because of increasing privatization of 
care work as benefits are withdrawn from jobs and public funding decreases. 
Julia Henly (chapter 5, this volume) examines low-wage employment by 
women in matched samples: one group of women works in low-wage jobs; the 
other group subsists on welfare. The study finds that differences in social 
capital-namely, supporting relationships that provide additional income and 
access to child care and other resources-are critical determinants of the choice 
between work and welfare. Thus Henly's research shows that women can't 
take advantage of opportunities unless they have personal resources to invest 
in those opportunities; and it shows great differences in the amounts of social 
capital women can command.19 Henly's research reinforces the basic principle 
that economic success is not derived from self-sufficiency but rather from 
being able to be dependent on others. In the male working world, of course, it 
often is assumed that a family will provide critical support for personal well-
being. Such an assumption is inappropriate with respect to poor working 
women. 
For women, another hidden issue-personal security (or more accurately, 
for poor women, residential insecurity)-is central to the capacity for employ-
ment. Housing typically costs low-income families a far larger proportion of 
their income than affluent families are likely to pay. Instability of income, which 
is much more likely among the poor, often has drastic consequences, as the sto-
ries behind the statistics for homelessness demonstrate. Domestic violence, of 
course, is another a major cause of homelessness. Aixa Cintron-Velez's inter-
views with women who are residents of shelters describe their situations in 
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terms that the nonpoor would not predict (chapter 4, this volume). Shelters can 
offer more than security, Cintron-Velez suggests. They also may provide a 
source of identity. One woman reported that she became capable of self-help in 
the security of the shelter; it allowed her space in which to develop greater self-
confidence and discover a new identity. Although a woman forced to enter a · 
homeless shelter looks like a displaced person to middle-class observers, the 
resident herself may experience the shelter as her only secure residence, and a 
foundation for self-confidence. 
Reinforcing and extending Stack's findings about the importance of social 
capital among poor women and men, Cintron-Velez shows that identity can be 
fundamentally affected by the social capital provided by a residence.2° Cintron-
Velez's window on life in shelters also leads back to public policies that affect 
the need for shelters. Recent changes in welfare law that establish strict employ-
ment requirements have forced many families without jobs off of public assis-
tance, and homelessness is one of the consequences. Cintron-Velez's research 
reveals still further irony. Although residential security can be an important key 
to the stability and self-confidence required for employment, housing is almost 
never mentioned among the kinds of social capital subsidies that will enable the 
poor to secure work and succeed at it. Indeed, as Cintron-Velez points out, pub-
lic spending for construction of new housing that might be accessible to the , 
poor has been greatly reduced over several decades. At the same time, many 
local governments offer subsidies for upscale conversions of existing housing 
stock that might have been used for poor families. 
Family is a central concern of both poor men and women. The low-wage job 
market has made it extremely difficult to keep a two-parent family intact, but 
those who are unable to do so often maintain different forms of attachment. 
Edin, Lein, and Nelson (chapter 3, this volume) offer an important corrective to 
the prevailing vision of the dysfunctional role of poor men. The failure of many 
poor fathers to maintain regular employment that supports the family is read 
broadly to indicate even greater dysfunction-namely, their complete nonin-
volvement as sources of economic support and as parents. This interpretation 
is incorrect. Edin and Lein (1997) discover that fathers constitute an important, 
if irregular, source of income and other help for the mothers who are raising the 
fathers' children. In their essay in this volume, Edin, Lein, and Nelson find that 
fathers want to be fathers. Their inability, however, to share custody because they 
lack steady employment-despite years of effort to secure it-leads to a life-
style that resembles, the authors conclude, extended adolescence. Although the 
motivations and values of many poor men match those of the mainstream, the 
unavailability of low-wage work takes a severe toll on their identity. Since they 
sometimes see themselves shut out of the domain of parenting, family, and 
work altogether, these men believe that their lives should be conducted accord-
ing to different rules. 
Ethnography undermines the foundations for stereotypes-and at the same 
time makes sense of such stereotypes as that of the detached, uncaring, un- . 
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employed African American father-when it shows how inequality that con-
fronts broad sectors of the poor, working poor, and low-wage mainstream is 
sustained, in part, by the social organization of low-wage employment. If we can 
document how the low-wage job market and the privatization of dependency 
affect all the working poor and many in the middle classes as well, the familiar 
negative images of poor women and men will lose their power to shock us. 
Interpretive research renders the ambiguous moral character of the oppressed 
poor irrelevant when it shows that social institutions create risks for the poor 
by compelling them to adopt extraordinary survival strategies and encourag-
ing (mal)adaptive identities. This research also demonstrates that the most 
effective social policy for ending poverty begins with the transformation of the 
social environment in which the poor live. 
Ethnographers recognize that identity is always dependent on contingen-
cies, and as we document the interplay between meaning, action, and situation 
in the lives of poor persons, we observe and report discrete moments in the 
uninterrupted evolution of their perspectives-their values and aspirations-
under the pressure of constant change. Sanders Korenman (commentary, this 
volume) responds to the continuous possibility for individual change by pro-
posing that longitudinal studies are essential to test the long-term effects of 
poverty policy. We do not live our lives within the boundaries of social tem-
plates, but within the contexts of our evolving consciousness. 
The development of motives, perspectives, and meaning--<::onsciousness-
provides room for individuals to maneuver. Thus we find openings in ethno-
graphic narratives of poverty for change and empowerment. Identity is a 
resource that may create space for action.21 Lucie White writes of a Head Start 
participant whose identity has many "potentials" that "come in and out of 
focus as she interacts with different people in different social domains." The 
woman's experiences at Head Start acted as a catalyst for change that increased 
her effectiveness in managing her life. White examines the critical events in 
that stream of change, particularly the woman's discussion of herself and her 
situation with a mentor and interactions with peers, and attempts to map her 
subject's course through the process. Similarly, Aixa Cintron-Velez describes 
an evolving consciousness of possibility that challenges the presumptions of 
outsiders about the oppressiveness and bleakness of homeless shelters. The 
resident who said that a shelter provided her first experience of stability 
claimed that this experience changed her outlook on life. Her subsequent abil-
ity to make changes in her behavior made her hope real, not an illusion. 
Identity also is a critical element in narratives of collective change. Partici-
patory research described by Frances Ansley has provided groups of workers 
experiencing the traumas of economic marginalization in the United States and 
elsewhere with opportunities to examine, understand, and ultimately organize 
a collective response. For example, in discussions of their plight with union 
leaders and academics, American workers in Tennessee who lost their jobs to 
Mexican maquiladoras were able to derive a new sense of identity-not crafted 
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by outsiders who helped the group get started-that oriented their anger away 
from the Mexican workers and toward their former employer and the govern-
ment that provided aid for the move to Mexico (Ansley and Williams 1999).22 
The discovery of possibilities for collective participation in efforts to change the 
balance of power in oppressive social relations may be one important route · 
toward change. 
Ethnography that finds hope for change and empowerment is particularly 
respectful of the perceptions of the poor, Michael Frisch notes ( commentary, 
this volume). Although elites often describe the poor as fatalistic-a charac-
teristic of Oscar Lewis's concept of the culture of poverty-the poor often 
make realistic assessments of their circumstances, and they make rational 
choices about their actions, given the knowledge they have.23 Frisch contends 
that the conditions of poverty create opportunities for perception not avail-
able to others: outsiders can learn about those conditions, and about how poor 
persons use their knowledge of those conditions, only from them. Narratives 
thus can make room between abstract generalizations about the oppressive-
ness of poverty and the individual who maneuvers to change his or her 
circumstances. 
DEMOCRATIZING POVERTY 
We have seen that stereotypes of the poor serve a variety of political purposes. 
We also have seen that consensus about severely restricting the provision of 
benefits to the poor is illusory. Attitudes toward public assistance policies are 
deeply conflicted. Fear of poverty and shame caused by declining economic 
fortunes can explain the psychological need of working-class Americans to 
distance themselves from images of poverty and make poverty the personal 
responsibility of poor persons. Yet many who express hostility toward poor 
African Americans-especially welfare recipients-and immigrants also sup-
port the extension of the social safety net provided by the welfare state to oth-
ers. This ambivalence reflects an important reality: that much of the rhetoric 
of welfare reform can be said to have served the purpose of reinforcing the 
work ethic of the working class itself. Explicitly, welfare reform reminds the 
working class of its entitlement to respect for being employed. Implicitly, 
reform reminds workers of their insecurity and dependence on their employ-
ers (Matsuda 1997; Kost and Munger 1996). 
Those who have not shared in the economic miracle of recent years-includ-
ing many white males who have lost union jobs and watched economic advan-
tages erode for themselves and their children-now face the same kinds of 
insecurity that confront minorities and women in the low-wage labor force. If 
our goal is to democratize poverty, to make it available as social construct and 
lived reality to others, Americans at all income levels must begin by acknowl-
edging their own experience with economic insecurity at some time in their 
lives. That insecurity may only have amounted to the threat of poverty; but it . 
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allows all of us to see into the world that poor people inhabit, to imagine our-
selves there, confronting the same hard choices between work and school, and 
between work and family. When we recognize that the dilemmas of the poor 
are like ours, we understand that they also share many of our aspirations and 
values. When we realize that they share our aspirations and values, we under-
stand that the poor are like us. Once we realize how alike we are, we recognize 
the importance of programs that address issues of durable inequality, different 
forms of low-wage labor, and the structural dependency of women. 
Ethnographic research harnesses empathy in the service of this project, and 
it helps us document for other working Americans a fundamental truth: but for 
the limiting and transforming experiences of poverty, most poor persons are 
capable of active participation in mainstream institutions. Ethnography makes 
the barriers to that participation transparent by invoking widely shared expe-
riences of the coercion, humiliation, and insecurity of the labor market. Of 
course, more is at stake here than the need for an accurate portrayal of the per-
spectives, capacities, and moral character of the poor. Truly to democratize 
poverty, we must attempt to change the self-perceptions of the mainstream. To 
that end we propose a model of moral equivalence between Self and Other, one 
that justifies the citizenship of the welfare-needing poor by demonstrating that 
most are low-wage workers at some point in their lives, and that all are poten-
tial workers.24 The perception that they are deserving is the key to income sup-
ports and other services for the poor.25 So perceived, the poor are seen to share 
the many risks and oppressions of the labor market with those in the main-
stream. In fact, so perceived, their identity is transformed, and the poor are 
entitled to become members of the mainstream, to enjoy the full benefits of 
citizenship. (Consider, for instance, employment protection policies that cover 
other workers: the Fair Labor Standards Act, pension rights, and Social Secu-
rity and Medicare.) During the New Deal, just such a transformation in iden-
tity was accomplished for elderly persons with minimum work histories who 
received a guarantee of federal old-age insurance. 
The oral historian Alessandro Portelli (1991) observes that the atrophy of 
movements for radical social change has left citizens of many Wes tern societies 
to face social problems alone, as the obsession with self-sufficiency and auton-
omy in moral, academic, and policy discourses amply demonstrates. The task 
of oral historians, he argues, is to convey difference as interdependence rather 
than as a form of hierarchy. Portelli is describing conditions for effective oral 
history fieldwork, but he understands that fieldwork offers a paradigm for 
research and, indeed, we also might argue, for policy. Meaningful change 
requires self-awareness on many levels. Research and policy are not only forms 
of intervention, but opportunities for mutual enlightenment and increased self-
awareness-both for those who need help and for those who want to provide 
it. Empowerment of the poor in their own lives, as we are empowered in ours, 
is the most democratic prescription for change, and it is reinforced by our civic 
culture of self-help. Whether as members of a voting public, elected decision 
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makers, or academics committed to the production of knowledge, we-the 
holders of power-can achieve this democratic end only if we recognize simi-
larities in our experiences, goals, values, and moral stature, and accept the 
equality of our differences of race, gender, and class, which then will cease to 
matter as sources of enduring inequality. 
NOTES 
1. Much of this research grew from the encouragement given by Congress after 1980 
to experimentation and innovation by the states in administering welfare under 
federal grant programs. Innovations intended to change the behavior of poor moth-
ers included combining welfare to work, training and education, and sanctions for 
having children while receiving welfare. While these so-called experiments (few 
met standards of scientific rigor) potentially told us that individuals worked incre-
mentally more or had incrementally fewer children under threat of sanctions, they 
did not test whether individuals will respond to significant opportunities, adapt to 
change, and act on aspirations or values. While some of these programs suggested 
that the poor can be pressured to find work, although the gains are small, they also 
suggested that sustaining self-sufficiency through employment in the low-wage job 
market is extremely difficult (Handler and Hasenfeld 1997). The research did not 
sustain the underlying premises for these programs-namely, that the microman- • 
agement of poor women's meager public assistance will increase their capacity to 
enter the mainstream or achieve a better life for themselves or their families in the 
longer run. In all of this research race has been suppressed. Race became a politi-
cally difficult subject for poverty research after the split in the civil rights move-
ment in the 1960s and as poverty policy entered the era of "benign neglect" (Katz 
1989). In recent poverty policy studies, race is omitted because it is deemed neither 
a direct cause of impoverishment nor a factor directly affecting the success or fail-
ure of relief programs. Yet race, like gender, is an important factor in the interplay 
of institutions and lives. Poverty is a racially coded concept, and welfare is racially 
coded still more clearly than poverty. Welfare policy has been influenced by the 
continuing patterns of institutional segregation whose origins lie in our troubled 
history of race relations. Countering racial stereotypes is an important part of 
redeeming the poor. 
2. Although traditional policy research analyzes the statistical effects of family struc-
ture, human capital, and economic resources on poverty, it does not employ more 
direct approaches to understanding who the poor are, what they are capable of 
doing, and how they might respond to different circumstances. Traditional policy 
research presumes that the lives of the poor require micromanagement by welfare 
providers; it tests whether particular forms of micromanagement produce st<!_tis-
tically measurable changes in behavior. In contrast, the values, capacities, and 
perceptions of the poor-their identity-is central to the work presented by the 
contributors to this book. 
3. Rainwater (1970, 27) concludes that redeeming perspectives on the poor may meet 
psychological resistance. He says, "such accounts will inevitably present the social 
scientists and policy makers with what Alvin Gouldner (1970) has called 'hostile 
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information,' that is, information that challenges their most deeply held beliefs 
about what people are like, why they act as they do, and what this implies for polit-
ical action." 
4. Further benefits accrue from scapegoating the poor by blaming them for systemic 
and institutional failures. For example, human services agencies may evade their 
obligation to administer effective poverty relief policies by characterizing the poor 
as unresponsive and irresponsible. Gans notes related economic functions of stereo-
types imposed on the poor. The identity of the poor is the raison d'etre for the 
human services industry. Separating and treating the undeserving and deserving 
poor is the purpose of their work; therefore, they have an enormous investment in 
maintaining this distinction. 
5. Public administrators attempt to create an appropriate sense of the meaning and 
purpose of an agency's tasks among staff members. Their shared sense of meaning 
is created in part by the professional discourses they employ to describe what they 
do and in part by myths they use to legitimate the agency externally. Discourses that 
suggest that what they do is effective, notwithstanding the failure of their clients, 
have an obvious appeal. Professional and political discourses that incorporate 
stereotypical characterizations of the poor have just such reinforcing implications 
concerning administrative effectiveness, and they may readily become part of the 
basis for the shared meaning of the activities of an agency, whether a welfare office, 
police department, housing inspection unit, or motor vehicle licensing office. 
6. This discussion draws on the insightful analysis of Jonathan Simon (1997), who 
argues that growing distrust of the Other-the poor, the nonwhite, the "criminal 
element" -has altered governance of our society. Governance no longer presumes 
that the mainstream and the Other can coexist out of mutual respect and respect for 
civil order. The social connections between individuals that previously formed the 
basis for decentralized order and control have broken down-at least across the 
social divides of race and class. 
Instead, power is exercised by means that rely on no mutual interaction at all, 
but ra ther on management by an algorithm designed into the system. The grow-
ing distrust is reflected in the evolution of quotidian practices of social control that 
make up governmentality. Culture-free regulation through spatial separation is 
replacing interactive communication and collective choice. Containment of norm 
violators is replacing disciplinarity and rehabilitation. Risk management is replac-
ing democratic choice and interpersonal managerial decision making. The image 
of the criminal Other-a person of color, poor, predatory, and urban-drives a 
wide range of public policies. The identity of the Other legitimates policies of con-
tainment, separation, statistically based crime prevention such as profiling, and 
punishment that affect not only criminal justice but also land use, transportation, 
public funding of schools, national electoral politics, and other major institutional 
arenas in which governance structures social interaction. 
7. Welfare reform in particular illustrates the role of the poor in governmentality. First, 
the desire of a large part of the American public to equalize the burdens of wide-
spread economic insecurity secured political support for strict work requirements 
for welfare recipients. Thus while work requirements may well have reflected the 
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displaced anxiety of workers, they also served an explicit purpose embraced by a 
large part of the public. Second, support for strict limits on welfare resulted not only 
from the desire of the American public to equalize economic insecurity, but from a 
successful effort by promarket conservatives and business to promote the belief 
among wage earners that economic insecurity is necessary, normal, and legitimate 
(Kost and Munger 1996; Matsuda 1997). Both interests were served by placing 
restrictions on welfare and punishing welfare recipients for not working. Belief in 
the undeservingness of the poor made it possible to take for granted that to be forced 
to work regardless of the hardship created would be good for the poor. This stereo-
type also helped weaken support for a plausible alternative policy, namely, making 
all workers more secure, because the stereotype assumes that no one is entitled to 
be more secure. 
8. Nothing in the new welfare law requires that recipients who must enlist in "work 
experience" projects as a condition of receiving their grants be provided the 
benefits-or wages-of "employees," even though they may be performing iden-
tical work. For example, a recent ruling by the New York Court of Appeals held 
New York's state constitutional provision requiring payment of "prevailing 
wages" for public works employees inapplicable to workfare workers. Brukhman 
v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 387 (2000). 
9. In the present fiscally conservative political environment, employment security, 
previous employee benefit levels, and legal rights to contest employer decision , 
making all are represented as forms of freeloading that must be controlled through 
public policies that "responsibilize" employees in the name of the common good, 
which is defined as efficiency and wealth maximization (see McCluskey 1998). 
Workers' benefits not related to the bottom line become legitimate targets for cuts 
because they are constructed in economic discourse as a form of economic fat, 
privilege, and immoral dependency, the mirror-image reverse of efficient, market 
driven, and therefore fair labor policy. 
10. The sociologist Charles Tilly (1998) describes processes by which societies main-
tain "durable inequality" in the distribution of access to privileges and benefits. 
Inequality, Tilly argues, is often by category, not individual by individual. Thus 
women historically have been channeled into low-wage unskilled work, African 
Americans are confined in neighborhoods and communities that offer fewer oppor-
tunities to build human capital and where social capital may be less adapted to 
linking with the mainstream economy, and immigrants are confined to illegal, 
desperately low-paid and underregulated work. Even before society judges and 
interacts with each individual, these groups start from distinctive positions of dis-
advantage. Tilly notes that such categorical divisions often explain how roles that 
seem open to all are regularly occupied by persons from a particular social class, 
gender, or race. For example, as the American economy has boomed over the past 
few years, many wage earners have benefited, but low-wage workers have fallen 
far behind. Moreover, the allocation of low-wage jobs disproportionately to women, 
minorities, and immigrants is an example of durable inequality based on processes 
of exclusion and marginalization that render persons in these categories avail-
able for low-wage and contingent work but less available for higher-paid main-
stream jobs. 
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11. Durable inequality is maintained, in part, by means of the identities that establish 
boundaries between groups (Tilly 1998, 64): 
Thus, as combinations of solidary and competitive interactions generate 
ostensibly racial barriers, they also produce genetically framed stories of each 
group's origins and attributes .... Different combinations of encounters, bar-
riers, and stories generate definitions of categories as centering on class, citi-
zenship, age, or locality. 
12. Many government subsidies create a moral hazard, namely, the risk that recipients 
will change their behavior to make themselves eligible for more of the subsidy. Since 
subsidies are intended to induce changes in behavior, evaluation of the so-called 
moral effects of a subsidy actually depends entirely on judgments about whether 
the subsidy induces too much or too little reliance. The language of moral hazard is 
misleading, since in principle no clear threshold exists above which the motive for 
seeking an incrementally higher subsidy is corrupt, rather than precisely what the 
law was intended to achieve. Judgments about whether reliance is too great or too 
little are strongly colored by political preferences (see McCluskey 1998). A great deal 
of research already suggests that the costs and benefits of wellare are a great deal 
more complex and create far less moral hazard than the reformers and public have 
believed (Edin and Lein 1997; Seccombe 1999; Zucchino 1997). 
13. A recent survey by Jobs for the Future (2000) indicated that 70 percent of all Amer-
icans favor government help for child care and training after adults leave wellare 
and enter the workforce. Nearly 90 percent of those favoring such government sup-
port would continue to favor it even if it required a substantial increase in govern-
ment spending. Surveys available from the Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research show that these views are enduring. Polls conducted in 1996, shortly after 
the new wellare reforms became law, showed that majorities favored providing 
increased job training and day care benefits even after adults left wellare and even 
if it meant an increase in taxes. See Kaiser Family Foundation 1996, Questions 26 and 
40; Coalition for America's Children 1996, Questions 62 and 72. 
14. Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation 1998, Question 15. 
15. NBC/Wall Street Journal 1998, Question 7. 
16. A 1997 poll by the Pew Research Center (1998) reported that 17 percent of the adult 
population acknowledges having lived in a family that received wellare. 
17. Controversies range from traditional labor value issues about the meritoriousness 
of wages negotiated by unions and entitlement of strikers to unemployment ben-
efits, the meaning of employee in a reengineered and downsized world, and the sta-
tus of women under Social Security. 
18. This rise in niche identities is linked to Anthony Giddens's (1990) perception that 
the modern (postmodern) world relies increasingly on trust between individuals 
and entities connected by extended webs of global interaction. As economic roles 
change in the way described here, however, trust directly is affected. We want 
Third World workers to be engaged in a free market economy partly because we 
then can trust them politically, since they will respond to familiar incentives and 
values. As workers in our own society work less, we trust them less, and we trust 
the poor least of all because their link to the materialism of wage labor has become 
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weakened. Robert Wuthnow (1996, 287-89) suggests that the lack of trust is a pro-
jection of the misg1 vings we have about the weakening, in each of us, of the moral 
values that have historically guided and limited our materialism. 
19. Human capital resources include soft skills, knowledge, and trust, which yield con-
fidence in oneself and a fit between identity and work. Much has been made of the 
soft skills deficit (Tilly 1998; Holzer 1996), but for many, the issue is not human cap-
ital but social capital and the conflict between economic work and care work. 
20. Identity may be affected in more than one way. Cintron-Velez's study suggests that 
residence in a shelter is a stepping-stone to employment. Stack's earlier study 
(1974) suggests that reciprocally binding relationships can help individuals take 
advantage of opportunities. Yet these binding relationships also may create an 
expectation that resources will be distributed and will not be used to facilitate the 
independence of those who want to return to school, rent an apartment outside the 
neighborhood, or marry and seek employment elsewhere. Contrasting behavior is 
displayed by the street-comer men in Liebow's research, who avoid forming rela-
tionships based on borrowing and, as a result, have greater freedom from com-
mitments, but also less social capital than the women described by Stack. 
21. Space also may be created by public narratives that validate the perception that 
power-including power to interpret the meaning and effects of poverty-always 
is shared between dominant social and political groups and the poor themselves 
(Frisch 1990; Handler, commentary, this volume). Counterhegemonic consciousness ' 
always has figured prominently in social history as a form of resistance (Scott 1990; 
Ewick and Silbey 1998; see also Du Bois 1903 on dual consciousness). 
22. Ansley's account of the conversations among the workers make it clear that they 
did not accept the suggestion of the union steward discussion leader. Rather, the 
workers subtly shifted the terms and conclusions of the discussion. They simply 
responded to the question that they had framed for themselves rather than the one 
posed by the self-appointed discussion leader. The consequence of this discovery of 
identity was a strong commitment to collective action to reach out to the Mexican 
workers. 
23. My own research interviews with poor women show that their opportunities for 
higher education sometimes are constrained, notwithstanding superior perfor-
mance in secondary school, by their lack of literacy, as it were, in the culture of 
higher education among those whom they trust (Munger forthcoming). 
24. I am not advocating victim narratives. Victim narratives create empathy by describ-
ing the effects of misfortune experienced by the deserving; they do not explore the 
qualities that make an individual a citizen. Victim narratives link suffering to our 
sense of duty to one another as citizens, but also place victims in a bind. Victims 
deserve their victimhood only if their behavior is perceived to fit model citizen 
behavior, an ideal few of us measure up to in reality. · 
25. Post-1996, funding for poverty relief has increased. Two explanations have been 
offered. Korenman (commentary, this volume) ties the rise in the minimum wage 
and increasing support for child welfare to the extraordinary economic boom that 
has reduced the economic insecurity on which welfare reform played. The Nobel 
Prize-winning economist Robert Solow (1998) links rising support for welfare to . 
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charitable impulses validated in part by the increased work requirements under 
wellare reform-both values must be satisfied to obtain political support. Accord-
ing to either theory, changes in poverty relief programs will be temporary and will 
leave untouched the underlying problems of the low-wage labor market as well as 
other institutional causes of poverty. 
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